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This paper investigates experimentally the extraction-decisions of a sole-owner of a fishery, the
population dynamics of which behave according to the standard deterministic logistic growth
model. Four treatments were implemented which differed in the level of information supplied
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of information about population dynamics, with efficiency varying across treatments and with
the amount of information.
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comments.1 Introduction
Renewable resources are those for which the stock can be continually replenished. Fishery
resources are renewable. However, if (through human activities or otherwise) the population of
some species is drawn down beyond a critical threshold, the species can become extinct. A
recent concern has been with the dramatic decline in the populations of several valuable fish
species such as cod, halibut and haddock. Since the seminal article of Gordon (1954),
difficulties in effective management of fisheries have been attributed to the resource’s
peculiarity of being a common property. However, due to the new law of the sea (established
in 1982) more than 90 percent of fish resources are now under the exclusive jurisdiction of
coastal states and can, thus, be protected. Every year the total allowable catch (henceforth
TAC) is determined. The TAC is allocated among the fishermen, the individual quotas are
transferable and can be reallocated through a market for certificates. In theory an optimal
resource management results. In practice, however, errors might occur when the decision-
maker determines the TAC, because the size, growth and population dynamics of the fishery
are not exactly known. As one consequence, the estimated stock size of the species is likely to
be different from the actual one.
The importance of the accuracy of stock surveys, and of the knowledge of the growth
function, for the purpose of establishing the TAC is considered in this paper. We set up a
laboratory study to measure the efficiency of the extraction-decisions in a deterministic
environment under different informational conditions. We find that if the growth function is
known, subjects’ extraction-decisions are nearly twice as efficient as when the growth function
is not known. Furthermore, accuracy of the stock estimate enhances the decision-makers’
efficiency only if the growth function of the species is known.
The paper is organised as follows. Departing from the classical logistical growth model, we
derive the finite-horizon extraction plan in the subsequent (second) section. In the third section
we present the design of the four experimental conditions in which experimental subjects were
confronted with different levels of information. In the fourth section the results of our study
are presented and related to the received literature. Finally, the fifth section concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
Consider the standard logistic growth function of stock xt (as depicted in Figure 1),
F(xt)=rxt(1-xt/K), where r>0 denotes the species’ intrinsic growth factor and K>0 denotes thecarrying capacity
1. In the open-access fishery, the equilibrium level of the resource stock is
determined by the ratio of harvesting cost to the price of the resource. Given costless
harvesting in a commercial fishery (as in the experiment), the species will be extinct for any
positive price. If the intrinsic growth-factor r is smaller than the interest rate δ  and costs are
equal to zero, extinction may be the only solution even in the optimal harvesting policy.
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Note: MSY denotes the maximal sustainable yield. The graph corresponds to the
experimental parameterisation.
Let the discount factor be denoted by ρ =1/(1+δ ), let the price be normalised to one and for
simplicity assume harvesting costs to be equal to zero, the optimal extraction policy in the
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Here, xt denotes the stock before extraction, zt denotes the stock size after extraction and yt
(the control variable) denotes the extraction in period t. The optimal solution to this problem
can be calculated by means of Bellman (1957)’s principle of optimality. Define Jn(x) as the
                                                       
1 This is the maximum viable (long-run) stock size.
MSY Kmaximum total value when only n periods remain, and the state variable at the outset of these n
periods is x. Thus, beginning with the last period, the decision-maker faces the following
problem.
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The final extraction yT that maximises this value function is equal to the maximal feasible yT,
which coincides with the stock remaining at time T, xT. Hence, J0(x)= ρ
T xT. Given J0(x), we
can calculate the next term of the maximisation procedure, J1(x).











As a result, the basic equation F’(zT-1)=δ   follows from the first order conditions, where F’(zT-
1)=r(1-2zT-1/K). Therefore, zT-1=K/2(1-δ /r), and yT-1=xT-1-zT-1. J1(x) equals, thus, J1(x) = ρ
T-1(xT-
1 – zT-1)+ρ
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which implies for the first term JT=x0-z*+∑ F(z)ρ
T-j+ρ
T z*, and y0=x0-z*=K-z*. Since the after-
extraction stock size z* is constant for all t<T and growth is deterministic it follows that the
before-extraction stock size xt is constant for t>1 and, consequently, the extraction yt is
constant for all 1<t<T. This result holds for any time horizon T<∞ , and also in the infinite
horizon management problem
2. The extraction plan in the finite-horizon management problem
coincides with the one in the infinite-horizon case (exclusive of the last period when the
resource has to be extinguished) because (in absence of harvesting costs) the marginal
productivity of the resource after extraction F’(z*) must always be equal to the interest rate δ .
Since both problems yield the same solution and the infinite-horizon problem is
impossible to implement in the laboratory, it is necessary to tackle the fishery management
problem in the laboratory in a finite-horizon setting
3.
                                                       
2 See Clark (1976, Ch. 2) for a derivation of a solution to the infinite-horizon problem and a discussion.
3 Given the earth does not exist indefinitely this approach does not seem less plausible, either.3 The Experimental Design
In the experiment, a subject had to decide hundred times on the TAC, i.e., how much to
extract from a privately owned resource stock. The extracted units were saved on the subject’s
account and the growth function was applied to the units that remained in the resource stock
after an extraction. The discount rate was δ =0. The applied growth function was logistic with
a carrying capacity of K=1000 units and the intrinsic growth parameter was r=1.5. The initial
stock size coincided with the carrying capacity, x0=K=1000.
Table 1. Experimental treatments
Four treatments were considered in the experiment which differed in the level of on-screen
information; in Table 1 an overview is given. Before every extraction the subject was posted a
signal revealing information about the resource’s stock size. This signal was accurate in the
treatments T1 and T3, i.e., equal to the resource stock xt, and in the other 2 treatments noisy,
i.e., the signal was equal to the resource stock multiplied by a uniform random draw from the
interval [0.75,1.25]. In the treatments T1 and T2, an on-screen facility (in Table 1 referred to
as information about growth) was provided by means of which a subject could anticipate the
consequences of any possible extraction for the nearest future before she/he confirmed an
extraction
4. Subjects were instructed accordingly
5.
                                                       
4 Before a harvest-decision, the subject would see a table with 11 possible extractions in 10 percentiles of the
signalled stock in the first column. In the second column the corresponding after-extraction stock sizes were
displayed, in the third column the resulting next stock sizes, in the fourth column the growth of the resource
(i.e., the difference between the third and the second column) was displayed, and finally the savings were
recorded in the fifth column. Additionally, the subject received such information in a scroll-box for any
possible extraction she/he would insert. Finally, if the subject was sure about extracting a certain number of
units from the resource stock, she/he had to confirm the selection by pressing a button.
5 Instructions and computer-screen designs are provided in the Appendix.
Informational condition Treatment
Information about exact stock size and growth T1
Information about growth and noisy signal about stock size T2
Information about exact stock size T3
Noisy signal about stock size T4The experiment was computerised
6 and of no-label, i.e., subjects were asked to maximise
the savings on their accounts. The research interest in the experimental setting was whether
efficiency would increase significantly if the amount of information was increased. The
individual payoff at the end of the experiment was determined relatively to the subject’s
efficiency performance: the units that the subject held on the account at the end of the
experiment were divided by the maximal possible savings (i.e., 38125, though unknown to the
subject)
7. The attained individual efficiency-ratio was multiplied by the maximal payoff which
differed from treatment to treatment
8. If a subject extinguished the resource before having
entered 100 extraction-decisions the experiment would end instantaneously, regardless of the
number of decisions entered so far. In order to limit erroneous extractions from the stock, the
subject would be forewarned if the extracted number of units exceeded the signalled units; at
the other extreme, an extraction-decision of no unit was forewarned, also. In addition, before
the 100
th decision was going to be taken, the subject was informed that there was no further
extraction afterwards. The preceding extractions and on-screen information, including the
stock signal before and after extraction as well as the resulting savings, were provided in a
history-window which the subject could access at any time of the experiment.
The experimental results which are reported below refer to 48 independent observations.
Twelve students taking a laurea in the Faculty of Economics of the University of Bari
participated in each of the four treatments. The experiments were conducted in June 2001 in
the ESSE laboratory at the University of Bari in Italy.
4 Experimental Results
This section reports on the results of our experimental study. It is organised according to
the chronological order of extractions: We start by surveying the first extraction-decisions,
then we consider the evolution of extraction decisions and consider thereafter subjects’ last
extractions. As a benchmark we refer to the decisions on the optimal path which would involve
an after extraction stock equal to the maximum sustainable yield (i.e., 500 units) and the
                                                       
6 The software was programmed by means of Abbink and Sadrieh (1995)’s RatImage.
7 The maximal savings are easily calculated by applying the results from Section 2: first, extracting 500 units to
reach the steady state (the maximal sustainable yield since the interest rate is zero); afterwards, extracting 375
units (equal to the growth in the steady state); and finally, in the last decision exterminating the resource.
8 The maximal payoff in T1 was 25000 ITL, in T2 and T3 30000 ITL, and in T4 35000 ITL (2000 ITL ≈  1… ≈
1$). The average payoff was 16.000 ITL; the experiment took about an hour.extinction of the resource with the final extraction. We conclude the section by drawing
attention to individual behavioural pattern.
The First Extraction Decisions
The first extraction decisions induced significant under-harvesting in all treatments (two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test at α =.05, n=12): subjects extracted less than the optimal 500
units. The deviations from the optimal extraction increased from treatment T1 through T4 and
differences were significant for all pair-wise comparisons but the T3-T4 pair (one-tailed Mann-
Whitney test at α =.05, n1=n2=12)
9. In the treatments T2 and T4 in which the stock signal
varied at random between .75 and 1.25 of the actual stock size subjects’ extraction-rates
increased significantly with the signal only in treatment T2 but not in T4 (one-tailed Spearman
rank correlation test at α =.05, n=12). These observations indicate that subjects were cautious
about not causing irreversible damage to the stock with their first extraction, and particularly
were aware of it when their information was limited to a stock signal as in T3-T4. It seems
noteworthy that extractions in T3 were lower than in T2 and at the same time they were not
significantly greater than in T4 (although signals were accurate in T3 and not in T2 and T4).
However, with their information of the stock dynamics, subjects in T2 were enabled to build
up an accurate mental picture of the task and could grasp better what effect their decisions
would have. Subjects in T3 and T4, in contrast, were ignorant of the stock dynamics and acted
more cautiously, because the task appeared to them more complex.
The Evolution Of Extraction-Decisions
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of average stock levels after extraction in treatments T1-T4.
Obviously, over-harvesting was not a major problem in the experiment
10. This is confirmed by
a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of the null-hypothesis that subjects over-harvest as
likely as they under-harvest. The test is constructed on the number of observations in which a
subject’s stock size after extraction was below respectively above the optimal one. The p-
values that result from the test are recorded in the first row of Table 2. The test rejects the
null-hypothesis only with regard to T3 and T4 in favour of significant under-harvesting at the
                                                       
9 Average deviations from the optimal first extraction of 500 units were in T1: 122 units (.24), in T2: 154 units
(.31), in T3: 343 units (.69) and, finally, in T4: 385 units (.77).
10 One subject extinguished the resource after 19 extractions in T2. The number of units she extracted then was
smaller than the number of units indicated by the noisy signal she received.Figure 2. Evolution of average stock sizes after extraction in treatments T1-T4 compared
to the optimal path
α =.05-level of significance. This result reveals important differences to the results of Moxnes
(1998a, 1998b) and shows also the limitations of the external validity of our results since
empirical data indicate rather over-harvesting. This point is further discussed in the
conclusions. However, the propensity to harvest more in T1-T2 than in T3-T4 suggests that
subjects are more confident with their extraction decisions when they receive information of
the stock dynamics.
From Figure 2 may be noticed that there is a time trend of average distances from the
optimal path. Distances increased with time in T1 (Spearman rank correlation test, p=.028,
1<t<100), and decreased in T2-T4 (Spearman rank correlation test, p=.000, 1<t<100). It
seems quite intuitive that subjects in treatments T2-T4 improved their performance on average
from one decision to the next. Since they learned the environment by means of feedback their
cognitive map of the task got increasingly more accurate over the length of the experiment.
Given that subjects in T1 did not receive any information from feedback that they did not know




































































mean distance T4Table 2. Deviations from the optimal path
 T1 T2 T3 T4
Pos./Neg. N(0,1)-statistic .890 .079 -2.21 -2.95
Deviation
a) p-value .374 .937 .027* .003*
Average Minimum 73 93 227 228
Distance
b) Maximum 190 299 417 408
To optimal path Mean 115 150 290 324
Time N(0,1)-statistic 1.33 .000 -.863 -1.33
Trend
c) p-value .182 1.00 .388 .182
Note: a) Wilcoxon-Test H0: P[yt>ψ *]=P[yt<ψ *], where ψ *= 0 if xt<500
and ψ *= xt-500 otherwise, 1<t<100 (xt being the stock before extraction
and yt the subject’s extraction); H1: P[.]≠ P[.], n=12. A +/- sign indicates
over-/under-harvesting.  b) Within treatment average distances of
subjects’ stock sizes from the optimal path; minimum, maximum and
mean over 100 extractions. c) Wilcoxon-Test H0: P[ρ (|yt-
ψ *|,t)>0]=P[ρ (|yt-ψ *|,t)<0], 1<t<100, ψ * as above; H1: P[.]≠ P[.], where
ρ (.) is the Spearman rank correlation coefficient of deviations and time,
n=12. The sign indicates whether the correlation is positive or negative
(see Table 3 below). *Significant at α =.05.
surprising that subjects’ performance did not improve significantly. However, although average
efficiency increased in T3-T4 and in T1 it decreased, the maximum average distance from the
optimal path in T1 over all periods still is bigger than the minimum average deviations in T3
and T4, as indicated in the second row of Table 2. Furthermore, within a treatment we cannot
find any significant majority of subjects who converged to or diverged from the optimal path:
as indicated in the third row of Table 2, a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test cannot reject
the null hypothesis that individual correlation coefficients of time-deviation are as likely greater
as smaller than zero in any treatment. The individual Spearman correlation coefficients are
reported in the right-hand section of Table 3.
The presumed objective of subjects was to maximise efficiency, i.e., without knowing
the optimal path they had to minimise the distance to it in each extraction. In Table 3 the
achieved individual efficiencies are recorded. Efficiency, i.e., the ratio between the actual
extractions divided by the maximal possible extractions, increased from T4-T1. Subjects’ mean
efficiency in T1 declined from .90, T2: .72 and T3: .49 to .39 in T4. Hence, the knowledge of
the growth function implied an average efficiency gain of 84 percent and the accurate
information of stock size induced an increase in average efficiency of 25 percent
11. However,
by comparison between treatments of subjects’ attained efficiencies an enhanced performance
can be verified only between T1 and T2 but not between T3 and T4. A Mann-
                                                       
11Note: the stock signal varied by 25 percent around the actual stock size.Table 3. Subjects’ attained efficiency and individual time trend to the optimal path
Efficiency
a) Spearman correlation coefficient
b)
s u b j e c t T 1T 2T 3T 4T 1T 2T 3T 4
1 .706 .095
† .057 .018 .562* -.444 -.431* .395*
2 .803 .488 .066 .036 -.324* .189 -.193 -.144
3 .810 .507 .168 .056 -.659* -.680* .142 -.288*
4 .877 .656 .192 .084 .017 -.141 -.311* -.338*
5 .879 .814 .358 .178 .416* .191 -.755* -.254*
6 .917 .836 .484 .267 .464* .069 -.333* -.146
7 .939 .853 .606 .557 .497* .087 -.806* -.236*
8 .942 .860 .658 .611 .676* .157 -.163 .625*
9 .950 .866 .771 .613 .704* .007 .536* -.453*
10 .974 .890 .791 .686 -.199 .079 .584* -.593*
11 .980 .904 .851 .695 -.099 .107 .601* -.383*
12 .993 .907 .922 .853 .012 -.224* -.239* .052
Average .898 .723 .494 .388 .167 -.003 -.119 -.138
Std. Dev. .087 .247 .317 .309 .429 .248 .478 .339
Note: 
†In T2, one subject extinguished the resource within 19 extractions. Her 19
th extraction was 2 units
less than the signalled stock and exceeded the actual stock size. a) Subjects’ results are arranged
according to their performance. b) Spearman rank correlation test H0: ρ (|yt-ψ *|,t)=0, where the optimal
extraction ψ *= 0 if xt<500 and ψ *= xt-500 otherwise (xt being the stock before extraction and yt the
subject’s extraction); H1: ρ (.)≠ 0, 1<t<100. Negative/positive sign indicates convergence to/divergence
from the optimal path. * Significant at α =.05-level.
Whitney two-tailed test of the null-hypothesis that extractions in the treatments T3 and T4 are
equally efficient yields a p-value of p=.378 and can thus not be rejected at a significance level
of α =.05. It seems to suggest that a higher efficiency level is not necessarily achieved if the
information about the stock size is accurate instead of noisy. With regard to the individual
performance in T1, T2 and T3, respectively, the resulting p-values of the two-tailed Mann-
Whitney test procedure are p=.045 for the T3-T2 pair, and p= .014 for the T1-T2 pair. These
results confirm that subjects’ extraction-decisions in T1 were significantly more efficient than
in T2 (at α =.05), and, respectively, in T2 more efficient than in T3 and in T4. Thus, high
performance requires apparently a subject’s knowledge of the environment. Moreover, the
ability of the decision maker to make use of more accurate information seems to result in a
higher efficiency only if the decision maker has a precise mental model of the decision task.
The Final Extraction Decisions
With the final extraction, subjects were expected to extinguish the resource. However, only
a minority did so: 8 subjects (16.7%) ended the experiment with a zero stock signal, 5 subjects
(10%) with a stock signal of 1 unit, and 35 out of 47 subjects (74%) left actually more than 5units in the fishery. More than 83 percent of subjects hence did not intend to extract the entire
resource in the final decision.
12 This is remarkable, because it seems to be one of the most
obvious maximisation tasks in the experiment. This can be illustrated more evidently from a
different perspective, in which we consider a one-shot decision of taking any amount of money
from some given pie. If this decision was a one-period (or two-period) task there should be no
doubt about it that all or nearly all subjects would take everything they can. Obviously, the
repeated extraction from the stock influenced subjects’ behaviour such that they did not realise
that the last extraction decision was different from their earlier ones. Ten percent of subjects
even left one unit which indicates that they were aware of the finality of their decision, but they
did not realise that they were able to extinguish the resource.
13 A possible source of this
confusion is induction and subject’s  experience. It relates to Popper (1963)’s problem of
similarity: People interpret a situation as a repetition of another, although they are not
identical. Subjects seem to have misjudged the situation in the last extraction on grounds of the
similarity to their former tasks of not extinguishing the resource. They failed to realise the
abrupt environmental change and applied their usual decision rule.
14
Control Theory and Misperceptions of Feedback
According to Edwards’ (1962) classical description this research is a laboratory study of
dynamic decision making
15. Brehmer (1992) remarked that experiments on dynamic decision
making are particularly valuable since real world problems such as company management or
even everyday life involve many dynamic tasks, and field data is difficult to obtain. As a general
framework for the study of dynamic decision making, Brehmer (1992) suggested control
theory (although not the mathematical term)
16. He pointed out, subjects’ overall goal in a
                                                       
12 The pair-wise comparisons between treatments of remaining stocks did not yield any significant differences
(two-tailed Mann-Whitney test, α =.05, n1=n2=12 (in T2 n=11)).
13 One might suspect that subjects with a lower efficiency in the first 99 periods performed worse also in the
final extraction. However, the one sample runs tests on the data (subjects ordered by performance) of each
treatment accept the null-hypotheses of equal performance in the last period regardless of the performance in
earlier periods (p>.74 taking the mean as the reference point).
14 Brehmer (1980) reported of several studies in which subjects performed not better if they were experienced in
specific tasks or not. Our data suggests that experience in certain circumstances might even worsen
performance.
15 A dynamic decision problem implies that 1) a series of decisions is required to reach the goal, 2) the
decisions are not independent, and 3) the state of the decision problem changes. See Brehmer (1992) for a
discussion.
16 This was noted before; see for instance Rapoport (1975).dynamic decision task should be one of “… achieving control: that is, that decisions are made
to achieve some desired state of affairs, or to keep a system in some desired state.”
Founding on the idea that subjects are trying to take control over the dynamical system we
can establish the research hypothesis that subjects try to hold either the stock signal or the
extraction level constant (through the extractions 2-99)
17.
Table 4. Time trend of individual extractions and size of stock signals
     T1 T2 T3 T4 Total
Time # P(ρ (yt,t)=0)<.05
c) 5287 2 2
Trend [%] [41.7%] [16.7%] [66.7%] [58.3%] [45.8%]
Extrac- WT
d) N(0,1)-statistic -.706 -.078 .706 1.334 .954
tions
a) p-value .480 .937 .480 .182 .340
Time # P(ρ (zt,t)=0)<.05
e) 8797 3 1
Trend [%] [66.7%] [50%] [75%] [66.7%] [64.6%]
Stock WT
f) N(0,1)-statistic -2.275 -1.334 -2.589 -1.883 -4.087
Signal
b) p-value .023* .182 .010* .060 .000*
Stock vs. WT
g) N(0,1)-statistic
h) 2.746 2.040 1.490 0.549 3.569
Extraction p-value .006* .041* .136 .583 .000*
Note: Tests are conducted on individual correlation coefficients with respect to a) a
subject’s extractions 1<t<100, b) the size of a subject’s stock signal after extraction
1<t<100. c) Number of subjects whose extractions increase or decrease significantly over
time [in percentage, n=12, N=48] (two-tailed Spearman rank correlation test, α =.05,
1<t<100, H0: ρ (yt,t)=0, H1: ρ (.)≠ 0). d) two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of Spearman
correlation coefficient H0: P(ρ (yt,t)>0) = P(ρ (yt,t)<0), H1: not H0, n=12, N=48. e) Number of
subjects whose stock signal after extraction increased or decreased significantly over time
[in percentage, n=12, N=48] (two-tailed Spearman rank correlation test, α =.05, 1<t<100,
H0: ρ (zt,t)=0, H1: ρ (.)≠ 0). f) Results of two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of Spearman
correlation coefficient H0: P(ρ (zt,t)>0) = P(ρ (zt,t)<0), H1: not H0, n=12, N=48. g) Two-
tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of Spearman rank correlation coefficient H0:
|ρ (yt,t)|=|ρ (zt,t)|, H1: not H0. h) Sign indicates greater correlation between stock and time
than between extraction and time. *Significant at α =.05.
The size of the stock signal after extraction decreased from extraction 2 to 99 in all
treatments as was suggested already by Figure 2. This decreasing trend was significant on the
individual level in treatment T1 and T3 as confirmed by the result of a two-tailed Wilcoxon
signed ranks test reported in the second row of Table 4: Subjects reduce their stocks over time
and do not hold them constant. In T2 and T4 a trend towards a smaller stock existed also, but
less importantly. A possible explanation could be that subjects were more cautious about not
extinguishing the resource when their stock signal was not accurate. In total we observe 31
subjects (64.6 percent) who significantly decreased or increased in time their after extraction
                                                       
17 In fact, it is difficult to distinguish between both goals (especially in T1 and T3) since we consider a
deterministic microworld in which variables are interdependent.stock signal. Conducting the same analysis with regard to the extraction dynamics results in
less severe outcomes, as reported in the first row of Table 4. Although 22 subjects (45.8
percent) increased or decreased their extractions over the finite horizon of the experiment,
there were no significant trends on the aggregate. In the last row of Table 4 the results of a
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test are recorded which compares the size of time
correlation coefficient of the subject’s extraction decisions with the time correlation coefficient
of the subject’s stock signals after extraction. The results indicate a greater correlation between
time and the stock signal. Thus it seems as if subjects did not make use of their feedforward
information in T1-T2 in order to control the future stock but rather intended to hold the
extraction levels constant. Evidence is thus a bit ambiguous.
In Figures I-IV of the appendix the trajectories of the individual after-extraction stock sizes
and signals are depicted. They are arranged from the upper left to the lower right displaying
subjects’ results from the least efficient to the most efficient decision maker. The figures reveal
that in the experiment we observed a wide range of behaviour. However, some patterns seem
striking.
For instance, most of the six least efficient subjects in T3 and T4 hold the stock very close
to the biological equilibrium size of 1000 units where the growth they perceived was very small
and they hardly extracted anything. Let us reason about this pattern in the light of Brehmer
(1980)’s observation that people tend to believe in a linear model rather than in other models.
Thus, if subjects believed in a linear relationship between stock size and growth it seems not so
surprising that some may assume growth to be smaller the smaller the stock is. It seems even
reasonable that they could have been convinced to maximise profits by maintaining a high
stock level. Such misperception in dynamical decision laboratory systems has been reported
from former research: Brehmer (1992), Diehl and Sterman (1995), Paich and Sterman (1993)
and Sterman (1989a, b, c) provided evidence for similar shortcomings of human behaviour in
dynamic laboratory settings. Sterman (1994) wrote that “… human performances in dynamic
(complex) systems is poor … even compared to simple decision rules. … The observed
dysfunction in dynamically complex settings arises from misperceptions of feedback
18. People
are insensitive to non-linearities and violate basic rules of probability. The robustness of the
misperception of feedback and the poor performance that lead us to create across many
                                                       
18 Moxnes (1998a) referred to misperceptions of bioeconomics when he reported from a fishery management
experiment.domains result from two basic and related deficiencies in our mental models of complexity.
First, our cognitive maps of the causal structure of systems are vastly simplified compared to
the complexity of the systems themselves. Second, we are unable to infer correctly the
dynamics of all but the simplest causal maps.”
Another pattern due to subjects’ misperceptions of feedback must be seen in the
oscillations that occur in all settings although subjects were informed that the system was
deterministic. These oscillations are persistent throughout the experiment. Particularly
surprising seems that subjects even in the simple setting of T1 (in which they had feedforward
information) induce cycles and oscillations in the standing stock, as depicted in Figure I,
instead of just holding it constant. Sterman (1989a, b, 1994) argued that in dynamically
complex experimental economic systems such oscillations would arise from subjects’
misperceptions of feedback. The persistency of these oscillations may be explained by the Paich
and Sterman (1993)’s observation of subjects’ poor learning in complex environments, and
from the fact that subjects did not receive signals in the payoff-space such that they could not
learn much from the feedback about the optimal strategy.
Finally, a pattern of decision behaviour relates to a rather small group of subjects who seem
to have applied some kind of experimentation: in the early extractions they deplete the
resource nearly to extinction (thus that they had the stock once to its both extremes) and then
continue harvesting at a middle range. Puzzling, however, is that this behaviour cannot be
observed in treatment T4 where it would be rather reasonable than in treatments T1-T2 in
which subjects received feedforward information and therefore could not learn anything new
from such experience.
5 Summary
In this research the fishery management problem was implemented under a finite-horizon
condition. We established the benchmark solution which disagrees with the infinite-horizon
solution only in the last extraction. This approach differed from other fishery experiments as in
Moxnes (1998a) or Mason and Phillips (1997) in whose studies “infinite” horizon tasks were
intended but sessions lasted only 20 or 35 extraction periods
19. As in their studies, extinction of
                                                       
19 Mason and Phillips (1996) considered a dynamic extraction game in which they varied the number of
extractors from the common pool. Moxnes (1998) reported an experiment in which subjects acted as sole-
owners of the fishery. The optimal solution to the management problem could only be determined numerically.
The task was as of infinite horizon: Subjects had to maximise over the horizon of 20 periods the sum of
extractions and remaining fish units. The control variables were the orders of vessels and utilization level of thethe resource before the end of the experiment was not a problem, although it eventually
happened. Over-harvesting was not a problem either in our study. This result diverges from
those of Moxnes (1998a, b) and may feed back to the differences in the experimental structure:
here, subjects had a direct control over the resource-pool while settings in Moxnes’ studies
were much more complex. However, we observe, as Moxnes does, pattern which can be
explained by subjects’ misperceptions of feedback: when subjects were not informed about the
growth function some seemed to assume a linear one. It would explain to some extent why
some subjects maintained the stock size at the biological equilibrium. Furthermore we observe
oscillations in all settings. Sterman et al. pointed out that in dynamic decision problems these
oscillations are due to the misperceptions of feedback.
Although misperceptions of feedback were a determining factor in subjects’ behaviour, we
observed high efficiency gains as a consequence of a richer information structure. Efficiency of
extraction-decisions was on average 25% higher if the stock signal was accurate, and 84%
higher if the growth-function was revealed to the subjects. Subjects’ harvesting policy was
significantly more efficient given an accurate stock signal only if the growth function was
known; and the spread of efficiencies between subjects in a treatment was smaller with
knowledge of the resource’s growth. It suggests that population surveys which stress the
reproduction activity of the species increase the efficiency of extraction-decisions considerably.
However, it should be noted that we considered here a highly simplified, deterministic model in
which the precise growth function is given or not. In a real world resource management
problem the decision maker faces an inaccurate growth model and stochastic fluctuations of
stocks.
Another striking result of our study was subjects’ misjudgement of similarity which implied
that they wasted the resource in the last extraction. This observation questions the practices of
some laboratory studies in which final stocks are evaluated at fixed rates.
In following research we intend to conduct studies with an increase of complexity by
introduction of positive interest rates, costs, and endogenous prices. The logistic growth
function which we considered in the experiment seems to be ideally behaved to provide the
experimenter with a rich research environment: the unique optimal solution to the
                                                                                                                                                                            
fleet. Every vessel had an average lifetime of 25 periods, thus that all vessels should be ordered at the beginning
of the experiment. Only the subject with the high score received any price. Moxnes (1998) reported over-
capacities of the fleet and so over-harvesting.maximisation problem can be calculated, although it is not easily recognised by experimental
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Figure I. Stock size/signal after individual extractions in T1
a)







































































































































































opti mal  path
T1- 2Figure II. Stock size/signal after individual extractions in T2
 a)
Note: a) trajectories are ordered according to the efficiency of the subject from most efficient to least efficient.
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T2 - 2 sig n a lFigure III. Stock size/signal after individual extractions in T3
 a)







































































































































































opti mal  path
T3 - 2Figure IV. Stock size/signal after individual extractions in T4
 a)
Note: a) trajectories are ordered according to the efficiency of the subject from most efficient to least efficient.
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T4 - 2 sig n a lInstructions
In the experiment you will have to take 100 saving decisions: you must decide how
many units you want to extract from a stock of some fictitious resource. Every extracted unit
will be added to your savings. Your task in the experiment is to maximise your savings during
the 100 extractions. After each extraction the stock will grow deterministically, i.e., the growth
is not random but depends on the number of units remaining after extraction from the stock.
Before you extract units from the stock you will be informed about the existing stock
size. [subjects in T2 and T4 read: However, your information will not be accurate but will be
subject to a random draw which varies from 75% and 125% around the true stock.]
Note: if your stock falls to zero at any time, your extraction in the remaining periods will be
zero by defect.
[subjects in T1 and T2 read: The growth function
By means of an on-screen facility (under the title “result calculation”) you will be able to
calculate the growth, the corresponding stock after (and before the next) extraction which
result from any hypothetical extraction. As a standard, this information will provided for any
10 percentile (i.e., 10%, 20%,…,100%) of your stock.]
Your payoff
There exists an optimal extraction plan about which you will not receive any information.
However, at the end of the experiment your payoff will be determined relatively to the maximal
possible savings: let X be your savings after 100 extractions and Y the maximal achievable
savings, your payoff will be equal to X/Y*{(subjects in T1 read 25000), (subjects in T2 and T3
read 30000), (subjects in T4 read 35000)} Lire.
The original instructions in Italian:
NB: L’obiettivo di quest’esperimento e` studiare come gli individui prendono decisioni economiche. I dati collezionati in questo studio devono
essere indipendenti l’uno dall’altro. Per questo motivo e` importantissimo che tutti i partecipanti in quest’esperimento prendano le proprie
decisioni da soli. Se hai dubbi circa l’esperimento alza la mano prima di fare la tua domanda. Non potete assolutamente comunicare tra di voi,
pena l’esclusione dall’esperimento.
Nell’esperimento devi prendere 100 decisioni di risparmio. Devi sempere decidere quante unita` vuoi estrarre
da una scorta di una certa risorsa. Ogni unita` estratta si aggiungera` al tuo risparmio. Il tuo obiettivo
nell’esperimento e` massimizare il tuo risparmio durante le 100 estrazioni. Dopo ogni estrazione la scorta
crescera` deterministicamente (questo vuole dire che la crescita della scorta non dipende dal caso, ma
solamente dalle unita` che rimangono nella scorta dopo l’estrazione).
Prima di ogni estrazione sarai informato/a sulla scorta disponibile. [T2 e T4: Cio` nonostante la tua
informazione non sara` essata ma variera` casualmente nell’intorno di 75% e di 125% della vera scorta.]
NB: se durante l’esperimento la tua scorta diventa 0 tutte le successive estrazioni saranno uguali a 0
automaticamente.
[T1 e T2: La funzione di crescita
Mediante un dispositivo sul tuo schermo (sotto la voce “calcolo dei risultati”) potrai calcolare la crescita e la
scorta prossima derivante da qualsiasi ipotetica estrazione. Come standard questa informazione e` presentata
sul tuo schermo per tutti i 10 percentili (10%, 20%, ..., 100%) della tua scorta.]
Il tuo profitto
C’e` un programma di estrazione ottimo del quale non riceverai nessuna informazione. Cio` nonostante, alla
fine dell’esperimento il tuo profitto sara` determinato relativamente al risparmio massimo: sia X il tuo
risparmio dopo 100 estrazioni e Y il risparmio massimo, il tuo profitto sara` uguale a X/Y*{25000, 30000,
30000, 35000} Lire. Questo importo ti sara` pagato alla fine dell’esperimento in contanti.The screen